Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 US 1 (1964)
| Holding | |
|---|---|
| The Constitution requires that members of the House of Representatives be selected by districts composed, as nearly as is practicable, of equal population. |
| Case opinions | |
|---|---|
| Majority | Black, joined by Warren, Douglas, Brennan, White, Goldberg |
| Concur/dissent | Clark |
| Dissent | Harlan |
| Dissent | Stewart |
Reynolds v. Sims, 377 US 533 (1964)
The "one man, one vote" rule (also called "one person, one vote") derives from the US Supreme Court ruling in Reynolds v. Sims, 377 US 533 (1964) that held state political districts of unequal size resulted in under-representation of some citizens' interests and over-representation of others'. This was considered "unrepublican," per Article IV, Section 4 of the Constitution, and also unconstitutional under the Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection Clause. In order to meet constitutional standards, districts had to be reapportioned so each had approximately equal population.
| Holding | |
|---|---|
| The Court struck down state senate inequality, basing their decision on the principle of "one person, one vote." |
| Case opinions | |
|---|---|
| Majority | Warren, joined by Black, Douglas, Brennan, White, Goldberg |
| Concurrence | Clark |
| Concur/dissent | Stewart, joined by Clark |
| Dissent | Harlan |
Justice Potter Stewart issued a concurrence/dissent, in which he argued that while many of the schemes of representation before the court in the case were egregiously undemocratic and clearly violative of equal protection, it was not for the Court to provide any guideline beyond general reasonableness for apportionment of districts. Stewart voted against the majority in the Colorado and New York cases; although Justice Tom C. Clark joined his concurrence/dissent, Clark did not join Stewart in voting differently in the Colorado and New York cases.
In dissent, Justice John Marshall Harlan II lambasted the Court for ignoring the original intention of the Equal Protection Clause, which he argued did not extend to voting rights. Harlan claimed the Court was imposing its own idea of "good government" on the states, stifling creativity and violating federalism. Although the Constitution explicitly grants two senators per state, regardless of population, Harlan further claimed that if Reynolds was correct, then the United States Constitution's own provision for two United States Senators from each state would then be Constitutionally suspect as the fifty states have anything but "substantially equal populations." "One person, one vote" was extended to Congressional (but not Senatorial) districts in 1964's Wesberry v. Sanders.
Baker v. Carr
Both Wesberry and Reynolds decisions were predicated on the landmark ruling in Baker v. Carr, 369 US 186 (1962), in which the US Supreme Court decided reapportionment of state legislative districts was not a "political question" that should be resolved through legislation. The Court found legislative conflicts of interest raised justiciable issues that could be addressed and resolved by the Federal courts.
| Holding | |
|---|---|
| The redistricting of state legislative districts is not a political question, and thus is justiciableby the federal courts. |
| Case opinions | |
|---|---|
| Majority | Brennan, joined by Black, Warren |
| Concurrence | Douglas, Clark, Stewart |
| Dissent | Frankfurter, joined by Harlan |
The opinion was finally handed down in March 1962, nearly a year after it was initially argued. The Court split 6 to 2 in ruling that Baker's case was justiciable, producing, in addition to the opinion of the Court by Justice William J. Brennan, three concurring opinions and two dissenting opinions. Brennan reformulated the political question doctrine, identifying six factors to help in determining which questions were "political" in nature. Cases that are political in nature are marked by:
- 1. "Textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department;" as an example of this, Brennan cited issues of foreign affairs and executive war powers, arguing that cases involving such matters would be "political questions"
- 2. "A lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it;"
- 3. "The impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion;"
- 4. "The impossibility of a court's undertaking independent resolution without expressing lack of the respect due coordinate branches of government;"
- 5. "An unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a political decision already made;"
- 6. "The potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by various departments on one question."
- Justice Frankfurter & Harlan's Dissent
- Justice Frankfurter, joined by John Marshall Harlan II, dissented vigorously and at length. Arguing that the Court had shunted aside history and judicial restraint and violated the separation of powers between legislatures and Courts.[3]
- Plaintiffs here invoked the right to vote and have their vote counted, but they are permitted to vote and their vote is already counted. The complaint being made here is that their vote is not powerful enough. They should seek relief in the legislative system, not the courts.
Read more: http://wiki.answers.com/Q/What_US_Supreme_Court_case_ruled_that_Congressional_districts_must_have_equal_populations#ixzz1Mf1gVIfp
